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Missouri Law Review
Number 3

JUNE 1959

Volume 24

THE LAW OF SURFACE WATER IN MISSOURI*
(Continued from the April Issue.)
CHARLES L.

IV.

SNODGRASSt AND LAWRENCE

0.

DAvIs**

APPLICATION OF THE COMMON ENEMY RULE OF
SURFACE WATER IN

MISSOURI

Following the adoption of the common enemy rule by the supreme
court in 1884,152 it remained for the courts to apply that rule in all of
the variety of situations which can arise in surface water litigation. This
part is an attempt to show the present status of the law in regard to
particular factual problems. Special attention is given to the liability of
municipal corporations and railroads, and the small amount of statutory
law relating to surface water is discussed. The final subheading is a
discussion of the law of surface water as it relates to terracing for agricultural improvement.
A. Appropriation
While the common enemy doctrine is not concerned with the landowner's right to appropriate the surface water on his land, some discussion of that right would not seem out of place at this point. As before
stated, 53 it is the general rule that a proprietor has the absolute right to

*Through an error on the part of the faculty editor, Mr. Snodgrass' name was
omitted as an author. In addition, his contribution was substantially greater than
indicated in the introductory footnote. We take this opportunity to tender our
apologies to 'Mr. Snodgrass.

tAttorney, Tuscumbia, Missouri; LL.B., University of Missouri, 1948.
*Member of the Missouri Bar; presently in active service, First Lieutenant,
United States Air Force Reserve (Judge Advocate General's Department); AB.,
University of Missouri, 1956, LL.B., 1958.
152.

Abbott v. Kansas City, St. J. & C.B.R.R., 83 Mo. 271 (1884).

153.

See note 48, supra.
(281)
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the use of surface water and riparian rights do not attach. The extent to
which a landowner may appropriate such water in Missouri has never
been directly decided, but inasmuch as the rule concerning the right to
repel and obstruct surface water is presumably based on the theory that
every proprietor has complete dominion over the soil, 54 it would logically follow that the right to appropriation would be practically unlimited.
Some jurisdictions have applied the same rules of appropriation to
both surface water and water percolating through the ground in no
definite channel. 155 A case decided by the Springfield Court of Appeals
in 1895,1 56 held that percolating water is to be regarded as part of
the soil and belongs to the owner of the land. There, however, the
defendants were enjoined from interfering with the procolating water
even though it was running through no known channel, because the court
found that they were acting maliciously and the interference was not for
some beneficial use or betterment of the land. If there is any validity in
comparing the landowner's right to appropriate surface water with the
same right in percolating water, then the former right may be limited to
the extent that the appropriation of surface water must be for the betterment of the land and not for malicious purposes.
When the overflow water of a stream becomes entirely separated
from the main channel, never to return, it is generally treated as surface
water, not only in regard to blocking and repelling, but also in regard to
appropriation .1 5 7 In Missouri, however, even that overflow which forms a
continuous body with the water flowing in the ordinary channel is considered as surface water so far as repelling it is concerned,5 s and the
question could arise as to whether such overflow will be treated likewise in regard to appropriation. In most other states this class of overflow is treated as still a part of the stream. 59 and accordingly riparian
rights attach.' 60 No case has come to the Missouri appellate courts raising
this exact issue. In a 1951 case, Blackburn v. Gaydou,'61 the defendant

154. See note 75, supra.
155. City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 207 P.2d 17 (1949).
In New Hampshire the test of "reasonable use" is applied to interference with surface
water or percolating water; see pt. I-C of this Article.
156. Springfield Waterworks Co. v. Jenkins, 62 Mo. App. 74 (Spr. Ct. App. 1895).
157. 56 Am,.JUe., Waters § 93 (1947).
158. See pt. I, § B, supra.
159. 56 Am. JuR., Waters § 92 (1947).
160. Id. § 93.
161. 241 Mo. App. 917, 245 S.W.2d 161 (Spr. Ct. App. 1951).
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had constructed a dike across his bottom land at right angles to a small
stream so that overflow water would be confined and collected upon his
land and deposit its load of silt thereon. The plaintiff was a lower landowner who objected, not to the appropriation, but rather to the unnatural
discharge of the water upon his land caused by the dike. The right of the
defendant to appropriate the floodwater was not mentioned in the court's
opinion, but it was recognized that "the purpose of the dike was not to
ward off the surface water," but rather for a beneficial purpose.
Because of the overabuandance of water in many areas of this state
at overflow periods and the relatively small use for irrigation at such
times, it seems that the landowner's right to appropriate overflow water
162
or ordinary surface water may go unchallenged for some time.
B. Municipal Corporation
Because of its activity in street improvement and sewer construction,
the municipal corporation is often involved in surface water litigation;
much of the law of municipal corporations has been developed in cases
of that nature. For example, City of St. Louis v. Gurno,16 3 decided in
1849, raised the question of the city's liability for obstructing surface
water and flooding the plaintiff's lot. That was the first case to come
before the Missouri supreme court involving the liability of a municipal
corporation, and it was also the first Missouri case reported concerned
with surface water law.
In that early case it was decided that the defendant city, being a
political subdivision of the state and functioning under authority granted
by the state, occupied a privileged position and was immune to a civil
action for damages for the consequential injuries to the plaintiff's lot
caused by the skillful execution of an authorized municipal plan to grade
its streets. It was indicated, however, that the city would be liable if the
injuries were caused by the negligent execution of the authorized plan.
This dictum concerning negligence was followed in Thurston v. City of
St. Joseph'64 in 1873, where it was held that a cause of action was stated
in a petition alleging that the plaintiff was injured in consequence of the

162. For a discussion of irrigation techniques in Missouri, see Rubey, SuppleOF Mo. ENG. EXP.
STA. BULL. No. 33 (rev. -d. 1951).
163. 12 Mo. 414 (1849).
164. 51 Mo. 510 (1873).

mental Irrigation for Missouri and Regions of Similar Rainfall, U.
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negligent manner in which the city constructed a sewer line. The decision, however, was not based upon the narrow ground of negilence. The
provisions of the then existing Missouri constitution provided in part that
private property shall not be taken, or applied to public use without just
compensation,' 16 5 and this was thought to preclude any municipal privilege.' 6 That broader basis for the decision was not followed in later
cases, 1 7 and it was not until the constitution of 1875 that the municipal
privilege was eliminated.
The effect of the 1875 constitution in this area was aptly summed up
by Hough, C. J., in Werth v. City of Springfield in 1883:
Prior to the adpotion of section 21 of article 2 of the constitution of 1875, a city could not be held liable for damages necessarily attendant upon the proper and skillful execution of the
plan adopted by the city council, but was liable for such damage
as resulted alone from the negligent and unskillful execution of
the work done in pursuance of the plan adopted ....
That rule
has been changed by the section of constitution above cited.' 0 8
Section twenty-one of article two of. the Ia75 constitution provided:
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public
use without just compensation. Such compensation shall be
ascertained by a jury or board of commissioners of not less than
three freeholders, in such manner as may be prescribed by law;
and until the same shall be paid to the owner, or into court for
the owner, the property shall not be disturbed or the property
rights of the owner therein divested. 16 0
In the Werth case, the plaintiff alleged that the city was neglect in
the execution of a plan to change the grade of its street, so it was
unnecessary for the court to decide the city's liability if the work had
been carefully done. The next year, however, in Householder v. City of
Kansas, 70 the court affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff based upon a
petition which merely alleged that the plaintiff was injured when the
city changed the grade of its street as authorized by ordinance. Also in
165. Mo. CoNsT. art 1, § 16 (1865). This provision had existed in the 1820 constitution as art. 13, § 7.
166. 51 Mo. at 516.
167. See Foster v. City of St. Louis, 71 Mo. 157 (1879); Wegmann v. City of
Jefferson, 61 Mo. 55 (1875); Imler v. City of Springfield, 55 Mo. 119 (1874); Schattner
v. City of Kansas, 53 Mo. 162 (1873). See also Hoffnan v. City of St. Louis, 15 Mo.
651 (1852); Taylor v. City of St. Louis, 14 Mo. 20 (1851).
168. 78 Mo. 107, 109 (1883).
169. This provision is now found in Mo. CONST. art. I, § 26.
170. 83 Mo. 488 (1884).
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the Householder case it was held that the provision of the constitution
above stated was "self executing," and could be the foundation of an
action notwithstanding the lack of legislative enactment. It was further
held that as there was no remedy provided for in the constituional
provision, a landowner could resort to any common law action which
1 1
would give him redress.
The Werth and Householder decisions interpreting the new consti1 72
tution were apparently overlooked in Rychlicke v. City of St. Louis
decided in 1889. There it was stated:
According to our adjudications, at this day the defendant
may grade and improve its streets, and is not liable for injuries
arising from the incidental interruption or change in the flow of
the surface water, save such injuries as may arise from the
negligent doing of the work. 173
The city was held liable, however, because after having incidentally
collected the surface water by its streets, the city had discharged it upon
the plaintiff's land in a concentrated stream. There was no indication
that this latter action was done through negligence, or in any other
manner than as prescribed by the original plan of improvement. Thus it
would appear that the absence of liability for the incidental change of
flow was not because of the municipality's immunity to suit, but rather
was based on the absence of a wrongful act under the recently adopted
common enemy rule. It is interesting to note that as soon as the protective veil of municipal immunity was lifted by the constitutional provision,
the protective covering of the common enemy rule was recognized in its
place.
Even under the lenient terms of the common enemy rule a municipal
corporation can not escape liability as it could before the 1875 constitution. It has been held under that rule that a city will be liable when, in
improving its streets, it collects surface water in a pond, and because of
insufficient sewer openings this is allowed to back up on the adjacent
land.' 74 The liability in such an instance could be based upon negligence

171. Id. at 495.
172. 98 Mo. 497, 11 S.W. 1001 (1889).
173. Id. at 501, 11 S.W. at 1001.
174. Kelly v. City of Cape Girardeau, 227 Mo. App. 730, 60 S.W.2d 84 (Spr. Ct.
App. 1933); Lewis v. City of Springfield, 142 Mo. App. 84, 125 S.W. 824 (Spr. Ct.
App. 1910); Carson v. City of Springfield, 53 Mo. App. 289 (St. L. Ct. App. 1893).
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.n making the drain pipes too small, or in allowing them to clog up.' 7 A
city will also be liable where it collects surface water and artificially
17
discharges it in a concentrated stream on the lands below. 1;
Notwithstanding the liability in the above mentioned instances, the
municipal corporation appearsto be favored because of its public nature.
This is especially true in situations where there has been interference
with the natural flow of surface water because of a change in grade of
a-street. For example, in Cannon v. City of St. Joseph the court said:
A city, being under obligation to improve its streets and
keep them in repair, may establish grades which have the direct
effect of changing the course of surface water, and run it in a
directi6n where it may do damage to landowners, which was not
suffered before the improvement. In other words, the natural
result following the street improvement will not render the city
177
liable, though it works injury.
This language of the court is often quoted as correctly expressing the
liability of the municipal corporation. Although this seems to place the
city in a- privileged position, it is submitted that the city's action constitutes no wrongful. act under the common enemy rule, especially when
78
is still
the._wide. scope, of pennissible interference under that rule
further broadened by the exception which even allows surface water
to be collected and discharged in a concentrated stream if that result
is merely incidental to the lawful improvement of the streets. 7 0 If this
submission is correct, then the liability of the municipal corporation
for the intereference with the surface drainage is the same as that of a
private individual.
C. Railroads
Much of the surface water litigation in Missouri has resulted from

175. But see Sandy v. City of St. Joseph, 142 Mo. App. 330, 126 S.W. 989 (K.C.
Ct. App. 1910) where the city was held liable although there was no attempt to
drain off the water so collected, presumably on the basis that the city had collected
and discharged the water on the plaintiff's land.
176. Rychlicke v. City of St. Louis, 98 Mo. 497, 11 S.W. 1001 (1889); Anderson v.
City of Jefferson, 262 S.W.2d 169 (K.C. Ct. App. 1953); Clark v. City of Springfield,
241 S.W.2d 100 (Spr. Ct. App. 1951); Zook v. City of Louisiana, 12 S.W.2d 518 (St.
L. Ct. App. 1929); Bodamn v. -City of New Hampton, 290 S.W. 621 (K.C. Ct. App. 1927).
Caveat, see Haferkamp v. City of Rock Hill, 316 S.W.2d 620 (Mo. 1958).
177. 67 Mo. App. 367, 370 (K.C. Ct. App. 1896).
178. See pt. II, § B, supra.
179. See pt. IV, § I, nra.
f
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the construction of railroad lines with their accompanying embankments, trestles, culverts and ditches. The common enemy rule is
favorable to the railroads. That rule allows a railroad to block the flow
of surface water with its embankment and cause the water to form a
pond on the lands of the upper owner.' 8 0 It was early held, however,
that the railroad could not build a culvert and discharge this water so
collected directly upon the lower lands in a concentrated stream.' 8 ' This
presented the situation of not only allowing the railroad to back the
water upon the higher ground, which was injurious to the upper owner,
but requiring the railroad either to let the water form a pond, which
was detrimental to its roadbed, or else place numerous small openings through its embankment which was neither good engineering
nor economical. As an answer to this problem, it was Judge Vories'
opinion, as expressed in McCormick I 182 in 1874 that, "If there was a
running stream of water in the vicinity of the road, into which the water
could have been drained by a ditch cut on defendant's own land, that
should have been done."' 8' 3 This idea was embodied in a statute in the
same year, 8 4 and with a minor revision in 1907185 remains the law today.
Section 389.660, MVissouri Revised Statutes (1949), requires all
railroad corporations to provide openings through their roadbeds and
suitable ditches connected with other existing ditches, drains, and watercourses so as to afford sufficient drainage and prevent obstruction of
surface water. The ordinary rules touching the diversion of surface
water do not apply to cases prosecuted under the statute; it furnishes
a different rule by which the liability of railroad companies is to be
judged.18 6 The present provisions of the statute have been in effect
since 1907, and a wealth of case law is available. 18 7 The statute requires
only that the railroad provide openings and ditches "to connect with
ditches, drains and watercourses" already in existence; where these are
not available the statute does not apply, and there is no liability for

180. Collier v. Chicago & A.R.R., 48 Mo. App. 398 (K.C. Ct. App. 189L).
181.

McCormick v. Kansas City, St. J. & C.B.R.R., 57 Mo. 433 (1874)

182. The first decision in the McCormick case, reported in 57 Mo. 43S (1874),
will hereinafter by referred to as McCormick I, and the second decision, reported in

70 Mo. 359 (1879), will be referred to as McCormick II.
183. 57 Mo. at 439.
184. Mo. Laws 1874, at 121.
185. Mo. Laws 1907, at 169.
186. Byrne v. Keokuk & W.R.R., 47 Mo. App. 383 (St. L. Ct. App. 1892).
187. See Annot., V.A.M.S. § 244.010 (1952).
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inundating the upper land. 8 8 It has been held that there must be sofne
drainway adequate to receive and furnish an outlet for the water
complained of;' 8 9 it need not be a running stream, but it must be a well
defined channel and not a mere depression or swale with no channel or
banks.""' HoWever it has been held that a natural depression through
which overflow water from a stream is wont to run is a watercourse
within the contemplation of the gtatute,""11 and the term "surface water"
in the statute includes overflow water. 1'2 Of course to provide an
opening in the railroad etbanktment where there is no natural drain to
receive the water would violate the rule against collecting and discharging to be discussed later;' 3 but it has been decided that the statute not
only imposes obligations on the railroad, but also gives it certait rights
in this area, and that a xailroad could not be held liable where its culvert
discharged a greater quantity of water on the plaintiff's land in the same
channel through which surface water had always entered the field, even
though the channel became three or four feet deeper and ten or twelve
feet wider as a result of the increased volume.' 1'4 Notwithstanding the
statute and an abundance of supporting case law, diversion of surface
water by railroad embankments constitutes a substantial portion of
all surface water litigation today.
D. Drainage and Levee Dittricts
Chapter 241, Missouri Revised Statutes (1949), provides for the
reclamation of ;swamp and overflowed lands; chapters 242 and 243
contain provisions for organizing drainage districts; chapter 245 contains
pro'Visions for organizing levee districts;'and chapter 246 contains provisions relating to the operation of the districts organized under the
preceding chapters.
Considerable litigation has centered around the activities of these

188. Vollrath v,Wabash
Wabash
189,
1913).
190.
191.
192.

65 V. Supp. 786 (W.D. Mo. 1946); Alexander v.
6.,

l.R., 38 S.W.2d 545 (K.C. Ct, App. 1931).
Pace v. St. Louis, S.W. Ry., 174 Mo.App. 227, 156 S.W. 746 (St. L. Ct, App.
Byrne v. Keokuk & W.R.R., supra note 186.
Jones v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 343 Mo. 1104, 125 S.W.2d 5 (1939).
Ibid.

193. See pt. IV, § I, infra.

194. White v. Wabash R.R., 240 Mo. App. 344, 207 S.W.2d 505 (K.C. Ct. App.
1947). To the effect that this may now be the general law as to increased volume.
see Haferkamp v. City of Rock Hill, 316 S.W.2d 620 (Mo. 1958).
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organized districts. The rights of landowners within the districts are
governed by statutes and contracts and their rights under general surface
water law are important only in regard to damages in the eminent
domain proceedings. 19" As to landowners outside the districts, however,
the organized district is a legal entity and treated much the same as an
individual."'
It has been held that a drainage district is a political
subdivision of the state, 9 7 and while it is not liable for the negligence
of its officers, 198 it "willbe liable where it violates the property rights of
others.199 To hold otherwise would be a denial of due process, as those
landowners outside the district have had no opportunity to be heard or
200
have their damages assessed.
As no special rules exist governing the common law rights of these
districts, the cases concerning their rights and duties will be discussed
under later appropriate headings indicating the problem involved.
E. Statutory Private Drainage Rights
Chapter 244, Missouri Revised Statutes (1949) is entitled "Private
Drainage Rights." The first legislation on that subject was passed in 1885
and was entitled "An Act to permit owners of land to construct drains
for agricultural purposes." That statute provided:
. . owners of land .. .shall be permitted to construct drains,
for agricultural purposes only, into any natural water-course
or any natural depression, whereby the water will be carried
into any natural watercourse, for the purpose of securing proper
*

drainage . . . without being liable in damages .... 2,

Under this act it was held that a defendant was within his rights
when he dammed up a small wet weather ditch at a point where it
entered his land, and from this dam then constructed an artificial ditch
along his boundary to the place where the same wet weather ditch left

195. See State ex rel. Chariton River Drainage Dist. v. Montgomery, 275 S.W.2d
283 (Mo. 1955).
196. Anderson v. Inter-River Drainage Levee Dist., 309 Mo. 189, 274 S.W. 448
(1925).
197. Ibid.
198. Arnold v. Worth Co. Drainage Dist., 209 Mo. App. 220, 234 S.W. 349 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1921).
199. Schalk v. Inter-River Drainage Dist., 226 S.W. 277 (Spr. Ct. App. 1921).
200. Bruntmeyer v. Squaw Creek Drainage Dist. No. 1, 196 Mo. App. 360, 194 S.W.
748 (K.C. Ct. App. 1917).
201. Mo. Laws 1885, at 157.
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his property. It appeared thaf without the "short-cut" the surface water
would have overflowed his land, and the ditch was necessary to secure
proper drainage. 20 2 As the same volume of water flowed off of the land
in exactly the same place, the reliance on the statute was probably
unnecessary.
The act was also applied in Gray v. Schriber,- 03 where a broad
natural depression started on the plaintiff's farm and ran through the
land of the defendant into a small stream. The plaintiff had made
"ditches and drains, or water furrows," leading into the depression to
assist the natural drainage, but there was nothing to indicate that the
volume was increased. To keep out such drainage the defendant constructed a dam about three hundred feet long and five feet high at the
boundary line of the farms, thus causing a large pond, about four feet
deep and covering seven acres to form on the upper land. The petition
sought to enjoin the maintenance of the dam, but the trial court ruled
that there was no cause of action under the facts stated. The supreme
court recognized that under the common enemy rule the defendant was
permitted to ward off the surface water, but held that the statute quoted
above gave the plaintiff a substantive right to discharge water into "any
natural depressiory, whereby the water will be carried into a natfira"
watercourse," and thereby the defendant was prohibited from obstructing
the natural depression. There was some indication that the water coming
through the depression did not follow a defined channel but rather
spread out over the defendant's. land. The court stated that if this were
true, the statute would not apply as it contemplated a "depression with
a continuous channel to a water course." 20 4 Subsequent sections of the
statute prescribed eminent domain proceedings 20 5 should it become
necessary to construct a drain across another's land in order to reach any
natural watercourse. In view of these later provisions it may be questioned whether the court was correct in holding that there was a
"substantive" right granted to the plaintiff to have the depression left
open, without compensation, merely because it started on his own land.
In 1909 the act was amended to allow drainage for sanitary pur-

202.
203.
204.
205.
statute,

Grandstaff v. Bland, 166 Mo. App. 41, 148 S.W. 139 (St. L. Ct. App. 1912).
58 Mo.App. 173 (St. L. Ct. App. 1894).
Id. at 180.
For a case concerning the eminent domain proceedings provided for in the
see Lile v. Gibson, 91 Mo. App. 480 (K.C. Ct. App. 1902).
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7

The present statute is limited to "any tract or parcel of swamp, wet, flat
or overflowed land" and provides eminent domain proceedings to construct ditches across "any tract or parcel of land situate between such
land to be drained or protected and any lake, bayou, hollow, creek,
artificial drainage ditch, river, depression or other outlet into which
the waters ... can be drained." 208 1

In 1951 the Springfield Court of Appeals reviewed the history of the
act. 20 1, It held that under the act a landowner could build a ditch from
his low, swampy ground to a natural watercourse on his own land and
not be liable for injury caused to a lower landowner, because of the
unnatural overflow from the watercourse. From the opinion it appears
that the result would have been the same even if the outlet for the ditch
had been something less than a watercourse, i.e., a depression or
hollow. Assuming that the result would be the same, would the statute
be abrogating the prohibition against collecting and discharging surface
water in a body on the lower land? This question was not answered as
the court expressly held that even without the statute, the defendant
was within his rights under the common enemy rule as he had acted
"prudently and reasonably.

2- 10

From the foregoing cases it appears that other than granting the
right to build drains across a neighbor's land, under eminent domain
proceedings, the statute may have the effect of preventing a lower owner
from blocking off surface water and forcing it back upon the upper land,
if the water is flowing through a natural depression with defined banks,
and if the drainage is necessary for sanitary or agricultural purposes.
F. Impounding: Liability for Backing Up
and Escape of Water Incidental Thereto
Assuming that a landowner has the right to impound surface water
on his own land in ponds or reservoirs,2 11 what is his liability for allowing
this water to escape? This question immediately calls to mind the famous

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Mo. Laws 1909, at 466.
Mo. Laws 1913, at 283.
§ 244.010, RSMo 1949.
Young v. Moore, 241 Mo. App. 436, 236 S.W.2d 740 (Spr. Ct. App. 1951).
Id. at 445, 236 S.W.2d at 744.
Section A of this part concerns appropriation of surface water in general.
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English case of Rylands v. Fletcher212 where the defendant had constructed a reservoir on his land and the escaping water flooded the
plaintiff's mine. There the doctrine was announced:
that the person who for his own purposes brings on his lands
and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief
if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do
so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the
2
natural consequence of its escape..

13

In Murphy v. Gilum, 21 4 a slight depression started on the defendant's higher land and continued through the lower land of the plaintiff.
The defendant maintained a dam across the depression near the property
line between the premises which caused a pond to form on his own land.
The plaintiff was seeking damages, claiming that there was a continuous
seepage of water through the pond bank which flowed onto his land
rendering it unfit for cultivation. The lower court refused to instruct
that the defendant would be liable only for negligence in maintaining the
pond, and the jury found for the plaintiff in the amount of twenty-five
dollars. On appeal the St. Louis court reviewed many of the- cases and
articles bearing on the doctrine in Rylands v. Fletcher and concluded
"thaL the.law of-that case has,-been-modified and explained tco such an
extent that it is no longer an authority anywhere. 2 1 5 It was held that
where one constructed a pond on his land he would be liable for the
damage caused by the escaping water only if the injury could have been
prevented by the observance of due care. This places Missouri in accord
with the general view that in this situation, liability will result only from
negligence.

21 ,

This requirement of negligence for'liability was affirmed in Farrarv.
Shuss,21 7 where the first count of the plaintiff's petition alleged that the
defendant had constructed a large reservoir and by reason of "insufficient embankments" the surface water collected was allowed to escape
"in large quantities" upon the plaintiff's land. There was no allegation
that the water was discharged in a body, or that the flow was increased,

212. L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866), affd, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (E. & 1. 1868).
213. L.R. 1 Ex. at 279.
214. 73 Mo. App. 487 (St. L. Ct. App. 1898).
215. Id. at 493. See Gladden, The Rylands v. Fletcher Doctrine and Its Standing
in Missouri, 18 Mo. L. REv. 53 (1953).
216. 56 Ax. Jun., Waters § 167 (1947).
217. 221 Mo. App. 472, 282 S.W. 512 (K.C. Ct. App. 1926).
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or that there was any interference with the natural drainage. The court
held that if there is no concentrated discharge there must be some negligence shown in the construction or maintenance of the pond in order
for the defendant to be liable.
The most recent case of impounded surface water escaping over
the lower owner is Blackburn v. Gaydou. 218 There the defendant had
constructed a dam at right angles to a small creek which flowed through
his land, hoping to catch the overflow water during flood stages and
cause the silt to deposit on his fields. The force of the water carried it
along the dan away from the creek until it ran around the extreme end,
and from there it raced down across the plaintiff's field in an unnatural
manner, washing away his topsoil. While the court recognized -the beneficial purpose of the dam, it affirmed the defendant's liability on the
basis of the rule against collecting and discharging surface water in a
single body. That rule, as later discussed, is concerned primarily with
restricting the right to rid the land of water, but it is submitted that the
correct result was reached, and if the water is discharged in a concenrated flow upon the lower lands as a direct result of the defendant's
actions, the purpose for those actions should be immaterial.
From these three cases we can conclude that there is no liability for
the escape of impounded surface water unless the escape is in a concentrated volume, or is the natural result of the impoundment, or unless
negligence is involved.
Escape of the water upon the lower lands is not the only source of
injury which may result from impounded surface water. The pond or
reservoir may be of such a nature that the water is forced back upon the
higher land. The second count of the plaintiff's petition in Farrar v.
Shuss 2 1 9 presented the reverse of the first count when it was alleged that

by constructing the reservoir the water was collected and "backed upon
and over plaintiff's land." This, said the court, constituted a "diversion"
for which the defendant would be liable. It was recognized that under
the Missouri law a lower landowner could build an obstruction at his
boundary and prevent surface water from entering, and in this manner
even throw it back upon the upper owner;220 however, said the court,

218. 241 Mo. App. 917, 245 S.W.2d 161 (Spr. Ct. App. 1951).
219. 221 Mo. App. 472, 282 S.W. 512 (K.C. Ct. App. 1926).
220. See pt. IV, § G, infra.
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"this is not that kind of a case for it alleges that the water was collected
into a pool .... This is inconsistent with the idea of warding off water
'22 1
coming onto defendants' land.
The distinguishing feature does not appear to be that in the one
case the water is merely trying to come on, and in the other it is already
there, but rather impounding the water repudiates its status as a "common enemy." As the defendant obviously does not treat it as a thing
to be shunned, then the rules of repulsion do not apply, and the law of
appropriation comes into play. Something akin to the rule of Rylands v.
Fletcher seemed to be the basis of the Farrardecision; i.e., the one landowner should not be allowed to gain a benefit at his neighbor's expense.
Many of the cases cited in support of the Farrarholding are primarily
concerned with collecting and discharging, or rather that is the basis
upon which the decisions are founded. However in one of the cases
cited, Frick v. Kansas City,22 2 it did appear that the obstruction erected
by the defendants was "near" the plaintiff's boundary line and the effect
was to "throw back" the water. The collection of the water was merely
incidental, being neither for appropriation nor drainage, but the evidence showed that the defendants had acted unreasonably in piling the
dit from a sewer excavation in front of, and to the side of, the plaintiff's
lot. The court' considered the rule that "surface water is a common
enemy that everyone must fight as best he may," but this was held not
to allow the defendants "to wantonly collect it by the aid of a dam erected
upon servient property and throw it back in destructive quantities upon
223
the dominant property."
The decision in Farrarv. Shuss seems proper enough as there the
defendant was utilizing the water, and certainly our conscience is not
shocked by the holding in Frick v. Kansas City where gross negligence
was involved; but it seems a fine distinction if the result of these cases
is that a lower owner can back up the water without liability when he
builds his dam on the property line, but otherwise if he drops back three
feet. Under the cases in the following section, this seems to be the law.

G. Blocking at Upper Property Line
If the lower landowner may not collect surface water on his premises
221.
222.
223.

221 Mo. App. at 478, 282 S.W. at 515.
117 Mo. App. 488, 93 S.W. 351 (K.C. Ct. App. 1906).
Id. at 496, 93 S.W. at 353.
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and back it upon another's higher land, we may ask to what extent may
he keep the water from ever coming on his land by building dams at his
upper property line. Since the very basis of the law in force in this state
is that surface water is a "common enemy," it is no surprise to find that
there is great liberality in allowing the lower owner to "ward off" such
water without becoming liable for the injury caused.
'Blocking the water at the property line may have two effects; the
water may simply form a pond behind the embankment on the higher
land, or it may continue its way along the embankment, leaving its
natural course of flow, and find a new route across the lands of a third
party. The courts in Missouri have made no distinction between these
two situations so long as the diversion results from an attempt to ward
off the water, and consequently the cases will not be separately considered.
In the early case of Laumier v. Francis224 the court supposed a situation where a city lot was raised, thereby causing surface water to form
a pond on the upper land. The uper owners right to the natural drainage
was given as an example of an easement, but that was under the civil
law rule and clearly is not the law today. In fact there is no other area
where the common enemy rule has7 been applied in such strict form as
in the area of blocking. As early as 1878 in Freudensteinv. Heine225 the
St. Louis Court of Appeals stated that an owner of city land could improve his lot and not be liable for blocking off surface water.
Shortly after the readoption of the common enemy rule in Missouri,
the Kansas City Court of Appeals in 1888226 held that a railroad company
would not be liable where its trackbed blocked the overflow from a
stream, and this water, following the embankment, ran upon the lands
of the plaintiff where it was not naturally wont to go. The court carefully
distinguished this situation from that where the landowner collects the
water falling and accumulating on his own land, and discharg'mg it upon
the lower owner. The court's holding in 1888 was followed in Collier v.
Chicago & A.R.R.,22 7 decided by the same court four years later. A
judgment for the defendant railroad was affirmed although it had built

224.
225.
226.
227.

23 Mo. 181 (1856).
6 Mo. App. 287 (St. L. Ct. App. 1878).
Schneider v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 29 Mo. App. 68 (K.C. Ct. App. 1888).
48 Mo. App. 398 (K.C. Ct. App. 1892).
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its embankment in such a way that surface water overflowed sixty acrs
of the plaintiff's farm land. The court quoted with approval the following
language from a Wisconsin case:
• . . if the proprietor in obstructing the flow or turning away
the water which comes from the land of another, changes its
direction, as in general he must, and it then runs off upon the
land of a third party where before it would not run, and causes
damages, no action will lie in favor of such third person for
22 8
the injury.
In Mehorney v. Foster,229 decided in 1908, the Kansas City court
reached much the same result where the land involved was city property.
The defendant had raised the elevation of his lot and thus caused water
which had previously run through a ditch on his lot to be diverted
across the plaintiff's land. As the water was not collected on the defendant's lot and was not discharged on the lower land there was no liability
for the diversion.
The St. Louis Court of Appeals made its position clear in Walther
2 30
r. City of Cape Girardeau,
decided in 1912. There the plaintiff had
filled in his city lot up to the street grade, blocking a small ravine and
catsing-a-large pool of stagnanrt water, three or four feet deepcavering
1000 square yards, to collect immediately above his land. The defendant
city requested the plaintiff to either open a ditch across his lot, or allow
the city to do it. Upon the plaintiff's refusal, and over his protest, the
city summarily entered and dug the ditch, laid a tile drain, and refilled
the opening. The lower court's order that the city remove the drain and
restore the status quo was affirmed on appeal. The court held that the
plaintiff was not responsible for the effect of preventing the water from
overflowing his land, and that his act was not unlawful in protecting
himself against its flow.
In urban areas the usual blocking case results from an improvement
of the land either by construction of buildings or by a change in the lot
elevation. Often in these situations artificial drainage is available, such
as storm sewers, and the upper owner has reasonable means at hand to
get rid of the backed-up water. On the other hand the blocking cases

228. Pettigrew v. Village of Evansville, 25 Wis. 223 (1870).
229. 132 Mo. App. 229, 111 S.W. 882 (K.C. Ct. App. 1908).
230. 166 Mo. App. 467,149 S.W. 36 (St. L. Ct. App. 1912).
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involving farm property most generally are on a large scale and usually
result from one of two agencies; either a railroad embankment or a levee
constructed by a drainage or levee district. The blocking of water on
rural lands caused by these agencies may have very serious consequences
to the upper owner, and further discussion seems warranted.
In Goll v. Chicago & A. Ry.,22 1 decided in 1917, the supreme court
gave its sanction to the rule concerning blocking being applied by the
courts of appeal, and went on to allow the defendant railroad to confine
the flood channel of the Missouri River in such a way that the plaintiff's
farm on the other side of the stream was overflowed. The court refused
to distinguish the floodwater which remained in the flood channel from
that which spreads out over the lowlands, and treating it all as surface
water applied the common enemy doctrine to its fullest extent. So long
as there is no natural drainway into which the water can be drained
(making it necessary to comply with the special railroad statute) a rail23 2
road can block surface water of any type with impunity.
A great deal of litigation has also resulted from the operation of
drainage and levee districts. As before stated the district is liable
23 2'
similarly as an individual to persons holding land outside the district.
A host of levee cases have brought before the court a problem similar to
the one presented in the Goll case. What is the liability for building a
levee along a natural watercourse, thus confining the flood channel in
such a manner that during high water the overflow is forced over
another's land where it did not previously run? There is no liability. A
typical case is Anderson v. Inter-River Drainage & Levee Dist.,234 a
supreme court decision. The plaintiff owned lands along the east bank
of the St. Francis River, and as a result of the defendant's levee which
extended for about twenty-five miles along the west bank of the stream
and opposite to plaintiff's land, the overflow water during floodstage was
thrown over upon the plaintiff's farm in unnatural quantities. In a very
informative opinion in which many related cases were cited, it was held"
that there could be no liability for the diversion so long as there was no
interference with the actual river channel itself. The case is cited with

231. 271 Mo. 655, 197 S.W. 244 (1917).
232. Accord, Keyton v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 224 S.W.2d 616 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1949); Alexander v. Wabash Ry., 38 S.W.2d 545 (K.C. Ct. App. 1931).
233. See pt. IV, § D, supra.
234. 309 Mo. 189, 274 S.W. 448 (1925).
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5

a 1950

decision..
This right to ward off or block surface water is an application of the
common enemy rule in its strictest form. It is recognized as to both rural
and urban property without distinction, and while most cases state that
it must be exercised in a reasonable manner,:-' " there seems to be little
limitation except for the statutory requirements previously mentioned
covering a limited field. One of these statutes prevents a railroad from
blocking surface water when it can ditch it into a natural drainway
sufficient for that purpose,2'3 7 and another would seem to prevent a lower
owner from backing water upon the upper land if the obstruction blocks
a natural depression with defined banks causing the upper estate to
become swampy, wet, or overflowed, and if the drainage is necessary
238
for agricultural or sanitary purposes.
H. Privilege of the Upper Owner to Alter the Flow
There are innumerable ways in which the upper owner can interfere
with the natural flow of surface water from his land. We have seen that
while he can defend his land against such water at his bondary, he may
beaome-liableif.ha impound&.it and either forces it back upon the higher
estate or allows it to escape in a body on the lower estate. This section
is concerned with his liability for altering the natural flow in ridding his
land of surface water which has flowed on his estate from above or which
has originated there by rain or snow.
Under the rule of the civil law the dominant owner was not permitted to interfere in any material degree with the natural flow of
surface water from his land. 23 9 On the other hand, a strict application
of the common enemy rule would seem to allow complete freedom in this
area.2 4- 0 This, however, has not been the case, as in almost all jurisdictions
following the common enemy rule there are some restrictions on the
241
landowner's rights in altering the natural flow.

235. 360 Mo. 1112, 232 S.W.2d 921 (1950). See also Drainage Dist No. 48 of Dunklin
Co. v. Small, 311 S.W.2d 29 (Spr. Ct. App. 1958).
236. See Clark v. City of Springfield, 241 S.W.2d 100 (Spr. Ct. App. 1951) and
cases therein cited.
237. See pt. IV, § C, supra.
238. See pt. IV, § E, supra.
239. See pt. II, § A, supra.
240. See pt. II, § B, supra.
241. See pt. II, § D, supra.
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The outstanding restriction upon a proprietor in Missouri can be
summarized in this stock statement taken from a recent case:
. . . the owner of a dominant estate cannot permit water to

collect on his own premises and then discharge it in destructive
2 42
quantities at one point in a body onto the servient estate.
This restriction on a landowner's broad rights under the common enemy
rule is as old in this state as the rule itself. In the first Missouri case
which clearly stated the common enemy rule, 24 1 this prohibition against
collecting and discharging was recognized. This was one of the things
Judge Vories sought to enjoin in McCormick I when he qualified the
common enemy rule by saying that every proprietor must "use his own
lands in a reasonable way." For a short time following McCormick 11244
and the Shane case, 24 5 this restriction on the landowner's rights was not
considered as a mere qualification of the common enemy rule, but rather
the rule of the civil law was thought to apply where surface water had
240
been discharged in a body on the lower lands.
The litigation culminating in McCormick I and II grew out of
injuries caused by the defendant railroad's embankment which collected
surface and overflow water, and the opening through this embankment
which discharged the water in a body upon the lower land. In both
times at the bar the defendant's liability was recognized, the first time
by applying the common enemy rule with its qualification against
discharging, and the second time by applying the civil law rule. But
when the common enemy rule was readopted in the Abbott decision 247
in 1884, McCormick II was overruled, and Judge Ray said that there
should have been no liability. This would indicate that Judge Ray intended to drop the prohibition against collecting and discharging when
he adopted the common enemy rule. That such was his intention is made
clear by his dissent in a later case.2 48

242. Blydenburgh v. Amelung, 309 S.W.2d 150, 152 (K.C. Ct. App. 1958).
243. McCormick I.
244. 70 Mo. 359 (1879).
245. 71 Mo. 237 (1879).
246. See Benson v. Chicago & A.R.R., 78 Mo. 504 (1883); Stewart v. City of
Clinton, 79 Mo. 603 (1883).
247. Abbott v. Kansas City, St. J. & C.B.R.R., 83 Mo. 271 (1884).
248. Rychlicke v. City vf St. Louis, 98 Mo. 497, 502, 11 S.W. 1001, 1002 (1889).
Judge Hough dissented in both McCormick II and the Shane case insisting that the
common enemy rule was the law of Missouri; his vote to affirm the judgment for the
defendant in McCormick II would indicate that he, too, did not intend to include the
rule against collecting and discharging as part of the law.
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Just one year following the Abbott case the common enemy rule was
seemingly approved without qualification by the St. Louis Court of
Appeals in Hoester v. Hemsath.2 49 That case held that there was no
liability where the defendant collected run-off water in a ditch and
discharged it into a marsh which extended onto the plaintiff's land. It
seems, however, that the enlargement of the marsh may have been the
result of sedimentary deposit and not the result of collecting and discharging the water through the ditch so the case has little significance.
A short time after that decision by the St. Louis court a case involving collection and discharge came before the court of appeals at Kansas
City,250 and it was there stated:
under neither [the common enemy nor civil law] rule has
the superior proprietor the right to collect the water in a body
on his land and precipitate it in a body, or in greatly increased
or unnatural quantities upon his neighbor, to the substantial
251
injury of the latter.
...

The court reasoned that such a right was not given by any interpretation
of the common enemy rule, and to allow such a right' would be "so
iniquitous and unjust as to be abhorrent to the sense of justice of every
intelligent nAn125!

This holding of the Kansas City court was adopted by the supreme
court as the law of Missouri one year later in Rychlicke v. City of St.
Louis,253 and with some alteration 254 has remained a part of our surface
water law since that time.
As this prohibition against collecting and discharging surface water
in a body appears to be the only recognized restriction upon the landowner's privilege of altering the natural flow, we will turn now to its
"-practical effect. Any alteration of the natural flow will usually result
in either discharging the water upon the lower land at a different place.
or in an increased volume, or both. If the restriction is interpreted as
applying to all three of these possible results, then it is submitted that

249. 16 Mo. App. 485 (St. L. Ct. App. 1885).
250. Schneider v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 29 Mo. App. 68 (K.C. Ct. App. 1888). Caveat,
see Haferkamp v. City of Rock Hill, 316 S.W.2d 620 (Mo. 1958).
251. Id. at 74.
252. The quoted material which met with court approval was taken from Pcttigrew v. Village of Evansville, 25 Wis. 223, 237-38 (1870).
253. 98 Mo. 497, 11 S.W. 1001 (1889).
254. See Haferkamp v. City of Rock Hill, 316 S.W.2d 620 (Mo. 1958).
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the effect of our law would be merely to enforce the "natural flow"
theory of the civil law rule in this area. Except for the abstract statement of law embodied in the general rule, the cases do not permit a
clear-cut rule showing the extent to which an owner can go in ridding
his land of surface water. The remainder of this section will be devoted
to application of that general rule.
It was early decided that this restriction upon a landowner against
discharging water in a concentrated stream does not apply where the
interference with the natural flow has resulted from the incidental
improvement of the land. In Thompson v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry.25 5 the
railroad company had improved its city land with a freight depot and
switch tracks in such a manner that surface water was collected and
discharged against the plaintiff's building with such force that the wall
collapsed. The company was not liable for the damage. The court said:
The rule that forbids the dominant proprietor from draining
his land by collecting the surface water into a body and precipitating it on the servient land does not apply to cases where
the diversion results, not from such wanton or reckless act
[digging a ditch]; but is merely incidental to the improvement
25 6
of the premises in a proper manner.
This exception of "incidental collection" is recognized in some later
cases,5 7 but the writer has found no later fact situation coming exactly
within its scope. It appears that by allowing the landowner to collect
and discharge the water when such "is merely incidental to the improvement of the premises," the court had in mind the changes necessitated
by constructing buildings upon urban property and may not have meant
to include the improvement of rural land, where such collecting and
discharging would be part of the normal improvement, such as terracing.
In Grant v. St. Louis, I. Mt. & So. Ry. 25 8 it was held that where a
railroad company had constructed a ditch for the "express purpose" of
collecting the water which had previously overflowed its tracks and
conveyed it to a culvert through the roadbed from which it was discharged on the plaintiff's field, such accumulation was not a mere inci-

255. 137 Mo. App. 62, 119 S.W. 509 (K.C. Ct. App. 1909).
256. Id at 69, 119 S.W. at 512.
257. Belveal v. H.B.C. Development Co., 279 S.W.2d 545 (K.C. Ct. App. 1955):
Sandy v. City of St. Joseph, 142 Mo. App. 330, 126 S.W. 989 (K.C. Ct. App. 1910).
258. 149 Mo. App. 306, 130 S.W. 80 (Spr. Ct. App. 1910).
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dent to the improvement of the defendant's property so as to bring it
within the "incidental" rule of the Thompson decision.
Aside from this one exception where the collection is incidental,
the courts have consistently applied the restriction against collecting
and discharging, and recent cases have been concerned with this situation
more than any other. There was some confusion in the beginning concerning the basis of the rule. In 1890, one year after this restriction was
expressly adopted by the supreme court as a qualification of the common
enemy doctrine,2 59 the much cited case of Paddock v. Somes2 310 was
decided. There the defendant was perpetually enjoined from maintaining
a drain pipe which carried surface water and sewerage from his own
lot across a city street and discharged it on the land of the plaintiff. The
drain so constructed -was found to constitute a nuisance, and under the
rule of nuisance, the court stated it would be no defense that the plaintiff
could have protected himself even with slight expense. However in
Tucker v. Hagan,261 a case where the defendant had constructed a ditch
on his own land which discharged water onto the plaintiff's field damaging his crops, the court did not talk in terms of nuisance but said:
...we concede that he [the plaintiff] was doubtless obligated
to use reasonable means tQ avertL and avoid such damage, if he
could do so within a reasonable time, and with a reasonable
2 62
amount of labor and expense.
Error was also alleged for the lower court's refusal to instruct that there
would be liability only if the "ditch had been negligently constructed
and maintained." This contention was held to be without merit because
the gist of the action was not the defendant's negligence in making a
lawful attempt to improve and reclaim his land, but was rather his
wrongful act in discharging the water upon the plaintiff.
This problem of "contributory negligence" on the part of the
plaintiff came up again in Kiger v. Sanko.2" ' There the plaintiff had
constructed a wall across the upper part of his lot to ward off drainage,
but because of the increased flow resulting from a ditch built by the
defendant the-wall col-apsed. The defendant argued that if the wall had
been properly built the injury would not have occurred. To this the
259. Rychlicke v. City of St. Louis, supra note 253.
260. 102 Mo. 226, 14 S.W. 746 (1890).
261. 300 S.W. 301 (St, L. Ct. App. 1927).

262. Id. at 305.
263. 1 S.W.2d 218 (K.C. Ct. App. 1927).
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court replied: "While plaintiffs were entitled to protect their land by
warding off the water they were not required to build an embankment
of the character that would protect their land in any event. ' 264 Thus the
gist of the plaintiff's case is not nuisance or negligence but purely the
defendant's wrongful act in discharging the water in a body.
The Kiger case is important in two other aspects. It was there held
that liability would result from discharging surface water onto the adjoining land even if the natural drainage was toward such land; and
furthermore, it is not a requirement for liability that the ditch carrying
the water lead directly up to the boundary line, so long as the water runs
"in a body" upon the adjoining land.
Under the general rule in Missouri that all flood water is treated
as surface water,26 5 it has been held that flood water cannot be collected
and discharged in a body upon lower lands,2 66 but in Hutchings v.
Wabarsh Ry.2 07 a judgment for the defendant railroad was affirmed where
in building its embankment the defendant had intercepted flood water
and forced it back into the main channel against the natural current so
that the current was diverted and thus caused to cut away and flood the
plaintiff's farm in an unnatural manner. The court held that the waters
were not collected but rather merely warded off, and the fact that the
current was diverted was an incidental result for which there could be
266
no recovery.
In a federal district court case, Vollrath v. Wabash R.R.,2 69 similar
facts were presented where the railroad embankment intercepted flood
waters; however there, instead of letting the water run along the obstruction and back into the stream, as in the previous case, a culvert was cut
through the roadbed allowing the discharge onto lower lands. Judge
Collet made an extensive review of the case law in Missouri and concluded that the railroad certainly was not required to maintain the
embankment for the protection of the lower owner, and yet it would be
264. Id. at 222.
265. See pt. I, § B, supra.
266. Blackburn v. Gaydou, 241 Mo. App. 917, 245 S.W.2d 161 (Spr. Ct. App. 1951).
267. 224 Mo. App. 1124, 33 S.W.2d 147 (K.C. Ct. App. 1930).
268. While a railroad company is ordinarily not liable for the overflow of floodwater onto lands adjoining its embankments, yet if the company obstructs the channel
of the stream and causes it to overflow, it will be liable. See Hoelscher v. Missouri,
K. & T. Ry., 182 S.W. 1078 (St. L. Ct. App. 1916); Standley v. Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R.,
121 Mo. App. 537, 97 S.W. 244 (K.C. Ct. App. 1906); McKee v. St. Louis, K. & N.W.
R.R., 49 Mo. App. 174 (St. L. Ct. App. 1892).
269. 65 F. Supp. 766 (W.D. Mo. 1946).
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responsible if it collected the water and cast it in a concentrated stream
upon his land. Following this view of the law the judge reasoned
...that the defendant is liable for the damage to the plaintiffs'
estate which results from the concentratedflow of surface water
upon that estate caused by the artificial condition created by
defendant, and is not liable for any damage to the estate caused
2
by such overflow as would occur absent the embankment.

70

(Emphasis added.)
If the analysis of the Missouri cases by the federal judge in the
Vollrath case was correct, we may infer that the liability for collecting
and discharging arises not from artificially collecting the water and
increasing the volume but rather from discharging this increased volume
in a concentrated flow onto the lower land. Such an inference is substantiated to some extent by White v. Wabash R.R.2 71 where the

evidence showed that the defendant had collected the water by ditches
and discharged it upon the plaintiff's field. The water entered the field
at the same point, in the same channel, and through the same culvert as
did- the surface water draining onto, the field before the defendant's
ditches were built; there was, however, a substantial increase in the
volume of water coming through the culvert. In reversing a judgment
for the plaintiff the Kansas City Court of Appeals based its decision on
three theories: first, the language of the old Abbott decision to the effect
that an owner can divert surface water from his premises "provided he
exercises reasonable care and prudence"; 27 second, a supreme court
decision which stated that every man my throw off surface water provided he does not "unnecessarilycollect it and discharge it to the damage
of his neighbor" 27 3 (emphasis added); and third, the statute previously
discussed2 74 which gives a railroad a right to drain surface water into
existing drainways. The statute alone would probably be basis enough
for the decision, but the court indicated that merely increasing the flow
of water through the pre-existing ditch would not be an "unreasonable"
exercise of care, and in this instance at least it was not "unnecessary."
The Springfield Court of Appeals reached the same result on similar
facts in the 1951 case of Young v. Moore.2 7 5 Although the special statute
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

Id. at 773.
240 Mo. App. 344, 207 S.W.2d 505 (K.C. Ct. App. 1947).
83 Mo. at 283 (1884).
Keener v. Sharp, 341 Mo. 1192, 1195, 111 S.W.2d 118, 120 (1937).
See pt. IV, § C, supra.
241 Mo. App. 436, 236 S.W.2d 740 (Spr. Ct. App. 1951).
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pertaining to railroads did not apply in the Young case, the special agricultural drainage act was involved.2 76 The defendant sought to drain-his
land more efficiently by widening a ditch on his land through which
surface water normally drained from his property to that of the
plaintiff's. The widening resulted in increasing the volume and rate of
flow through the ditch to the plaintiff's injury. The old case of Gray v.
Schriber2 7 7 had many years previous held that the agricultural drainage
statute gave the upper owner a substantive right to drainage through the
natural depression, thus preventing the lower owner from damming off
the ditch. It was but one more step for the Springfield court to say
that there would be no liability for merely increasing the volume and
rate of flow. The court expressly stated that the defendant had not gone
beyond his rights under the common enemy rule as he had acted
"prudently and reasonably." While it is no doubt desirable that agricultural land be properly drained, anyone familiar with soil erosion 'can
appreciate the problem of the lower landowner. Also, as the natural
drainway had its beginning on the upper land being drained, then the
provision in the special statute for private condemnation and payment 6f
damages did not apply.
Both cases, White v,Wabash R.R. and Young v. Moore, deal with
rural land and both involve special statutes, but a look at some recent
cases arising from urban development will show that there is little, if
any, diffebrce in the treatment of theotwo types of land.
The first such case to be discussed is a 1948 court of appeals decision,
Casonave'o. Villatm)a Realty Co.,27 which holds that there is no liability for merely increasing the volume of water flowing upon the servient
estate over a broad area. The realty company had purchased a large tract
of vacant land for development as a subdivision. The natural slope of
the land was toward the adjoining lots of the plaintiffs, but a ravine had
carried much of the drainage into a sewer, and a mound of dirt had
protected the plaintiffs lots from the remainder. In the course of
developing the land the defendant graded off the mound of dirt and filled
up the ravine. Although the grade of the defendant's land was -1 -red,
the total area drained remained the same. All the vegetation and topsoil

276. 244.010, RSMo 1949. See pt. IV, § E, sapra.
277. 58 to.App. 173 (St. L. Ct. App. 1894).
278. 209 S.W.2d 556 (St. L. Cf. App. 1948).
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were removed leaving a barren clay slope which, instead of absorbing
the rainfall, allowed it to flow freely onto the plaintiff's lower lots,
carrying with it the mud and silt picked up in its course. The plaintiffs'
petition seeking to enjoin the defendant from permitting the flowage
was denied by the circuit court and this was affirmed on appeal. The
St. Louis Court of Appeals held that as the plaintiffs' land was lower, it
was the natural recipient of the water, and while the volume may have
been increased, the defendant had not collected the water in any fashion.
As the upper landowner had the right to alter and change the surface of
his property in any way he saw fit he could not be charged with negligence in doing that which the law permitted him to do. As to the mud
and silt, the court held that this was part of the surface water, reasoning
that "overflow water is surface water and it is common knowledge that
27 9
it is laden with silt.and the off-scourings of land.1
Notwithstanding the broad application of the common enemy rule by
the St. Louis Court of Appeals in the Casanover case, only one year later,
in 1949, the same court handed down an opinion tinged with the "natural
flow" doctrine. In Polich v. Herman 0-8 0 the plaintiffs and defendants
were adjoining city lot owners sharing a "common" driveway between
them. The driveway was seven and one-half feet on each lot, and the
evidence showed that before the acts occurred which brought about the
litigation, it was level "all the way across." The evidence also showed
that the defendants had placed about three loads of dirt on their side of
the driveway in such a manner as to make it slope downward to the
plaintiff's side. During heavy rains the surface water ran from the
defendants' lot, across the driveway and into the plaintiffs' basement
carrying dirt and debris. The plaintiffs were seeking a mandatory
injunction forcing the removal of the dirt from the defendant7' half of the
driveway, the bill alleging that the dirt caused the surface water to
accumulate and be discharged in abnormally large quantities upon the
lower lot. It appears that the water actually was collected upon the
higher ground, especially by the defendants' drainpipe which emptied
onto the defendants' lot directly above the driveway, but this water was
discharged in a body upon the lower land only to the extent that it
flowed across the driveway in a broad sheet. Notwithstanding the lack

279.
280.

Id. at 559.
219 S.W.2d 849 (St. L. Ct. App. 1949).
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of a concentrated stream of water coming from the upper land, the court
granted the injunction. The basis of the decision is not altogether clear
and could not be misleading were the law in this state is not quite so well
settled. The only recent surface water case relied upon was Keener v.
Sharp.28' The dictum of that case was quoted which forbids a landowner
from unnecessarily collecting and discharging water. 282 Judge McCullen of the St. Louis court said the evidence:
shows actions and conduct and things done by defendants in
connection with the maintenance of their side of the driveway
which changed the natural 'lay of the land' and caused surface
water to overflow in abnormally large quantities from de283
fendants' side of the driveway onto plaintiffs' side.
The Keener case was then cited as authority for holding such conduct
of the defendants unlawful. The judge approved language to the effect-that it is unlawful to discharge surface water in a body even though it
may be no greated in amount than would naturally flow upon the
property in a diffused condition. This is no doubt the law of this state
and has a sound basis
for it is evident that while a given piece of land may receive a
large amount of surface water without injury thereto when
it flows thereon from natural causes, yet when collected and
discharged in considerable volume at a given point, it may
2 84
become very destructive and injurious.
Aside from this, however, the following language was also approved:
[A]n upper owner has no right to increase materially the
quantity or volume of water discharged upon the lower estate;
nor may the upper owner discharge water in a different manner
than it would usually and ordinarily have gone in the natural
course of drainage . . .the upper owner may not accelerate the

flow where it results in injury to the lower proprietor. 285 (Emphasis added.)
For this statement of law the opinion cites as dubious authority the 1903
case of Ready v. Missouri Pacific Ry.28 6 where there was clearly a

281. 341 Mo. 1192, 111 S.W.2d 118 (1937).
282. The Keener case was concerned with liability for blocking what was determined to be a natural watercourse.
281. 219 S.W.2d at 854.
284. Id. at 855.
285. Ibid.
286. 98 Mo. App. 467, 72 S.W. 142 (K.C. Ct. App. 1903).
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matter of collecting the water. Lastly the Polch opinion refers to Biclman v. City of St. Joseph,2 8 7 a 1924 decision. In this case a landowner
was held liable for injuries sustained by the plaintiff who had slipped
upon ice which resulted from water collected upon the landowner's
walkway and from there discharged on the public walk where it froze.
On those facts Judge McCullen concluded that the case held:
...
that if an upper owner causes water flowing on his land to
discharge on the lower estate at a point not its natural destination, to the lower owner's injury, the former is liable for the
288
damage.
While this conclusion is not entirely correct, it states a greater restriction on the upper owner than the Missouri cases ordinarily hold, and the
28 9
loose language includes many terms of the civil law rule.
Polich v. Hermann is the last word of the St. Louis court concerning
the privilege of the upper owner to change the flow of surface water, but
any restrictions seemingly added by that decision have been wiped away
hy mare-recent-supreze court cases The Kansas .City court also has
been recently confronted with a case of collection and discharge of
surface water. In Belveal v. H.B.C. Development Co.,2 90 a situation simliar to the C-asanover case was presented to that court. There, also, the
land was stripped of vegetation and graded, and a small ravine was filled
with dirt. Unlike the Casanover case, however, there were no heavy
rains during the development stage and the defendant company finished
the grading, erected houses, sodded in the yards, and constructed a fifty-foot macadamized street with concrete curbs down the center of the
subdivision. The lots were so graded that the front part of each one
sloped downward to the street; the street sloped from each end toward
the middle, and the entire run-off of surface water flowed into a catch
basin at the low point. From the catch basin this water ran through a
pipe and was discharged into a ditch on the defendant's land which
previous to construction had carried most of the surface run-off, and
which led directly into a small fish pond on the plaintiffs' land. After
a heavy rain the small pond was flooded and filled with mud and silt
287.
288.
289.
166 Mo.

260 S.W. 529 (K.C. Ct. App. 1924).
219 S.W.2d at 856.
In another decision by the St. Louis Court of Appeals, Grandstaff v. Bland,
App. 41, 148 S.W. 139 (1912), there is also language which would seem to

prohibit any alteration of the natural flow from the upper land.
290. 279 S.W.2d 545 (K.C. Ct. App. 1955).
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making it a mere "mudhole." It was the contention of the defendant
that there was no increase in the total Volume of water entering the
plaintiffs' land as the acreage draining into the pond was still the same
and there was no new point of discharge. There was some evidence,
however, that part of the water had previously entered the plaintiff's
land in a diffused manner and not through the ditch, and of course the
construction of the street and houses would lesser the area in which the
water could be absorbed. The Kansas City court merely held "a jury
could reasonably find that defendant collected surface water on its land
and discharged the water in a concentrated volume onto the plaintiffs'
land."' 20 1 If these same facts were to come before that court today, very
likely the holding would be different in light of a recent supreme court
decision presently to be discussed.
Two decisions handed down by our supreme court during 1958 deal
directly with the collection of surface water. Both concern city property.
The first, Blydenburgh v. Amelung, 292 added very little toward further
development of the law in this area, and the opinion was couched in
general terms, but the most recent case, Haferkamp v. City of Rock
Hill,2 9 3 concerns the question of one's right to increase the volume and
rate of flow through a pre-existing ditch, and makes specific application
of many general expressions found in earlier cases. The answer to this
question has already been indicated by White v. Wabash R.R. 294 and
Young v. Moore29 5 where no liability was found, but in those cases special
statutes were involved. Haferkamp is another subdivision development
case, decided purely on common law principles, and the factual situation
is almost identical with that of Belveal v. H.B.C. Development Co. 296
Like the Belveal case, the subdivision had neared completion before the
rains came. In Haferkamp, three streets were built and about sixty-five
dwelling constructed, all within an area which previously had been
"rolling" ground covered with grass, pasture and a few trees. The surface

291. Id. at 553.
In Anderson v. City of Jefferson, 262 S.W.2d 169 (K.C. Ct. App. 1953), there was
liability where the volume of surface water coming through a culvert onto the plaintiffs land was increased because of the development of a subdivision; however, the
acreage may have been increased.
292. 309 S.W.2d 150 (Mo. 1958).
293. 316 S.W.2d 620 (Mo. 1958).
294. 240 Mo. App. 344, 207 S.W.2d 505 (K.C. Ct. App. 1947).
295. 241 Mo. App. 436, 236 S.W.2d 740 (Spr. Ct. App. 1951).
296. 279 S.W.2d 545 (K.C. Ct. App. 1955).
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water from this area, prior to its development, had drained into a ditch

about fifty feet wide and ten feet deep, which began on the defendant's
land and ran from that parcel across other lots toward the land of the
plaintiff where it ended just short of his property line. The water flowing
through the ditch, however, continued onto the plaintiff's land and flowed
into a large "sinkhole' or depression and disappeared into the ground.
During the course of development -of the defendant's subdivision a
twenty-seven inch concrete tile was buried in the old ditch, and this tile
carried the surface water collected by the houses and streets to the
same place where it had prviously left the defendant's land, but in a
much greater quantity. The volume of water now coming onto the
plaintiff's land was greater than that which could be absorbed in the
sinkhole with the result that the water flooded the plaintiff's basement
(it was shown that the basement had been flooded before). The evidence
showed that the plaintiff had by easement allowed water from another
watershed to be piped into the sinkhole, and also that he had walled off
the sinkhole so that apparently no water could get into the hole except
through the easement pipp.e The plaintiff recovered a judgment of $17,800
in the trial court, but the supreme court reversed and remanded because
of the "mistaken legal theory" emboided in the plaintiff's verdict-directing instruction. That instruction authorized the plaintiff's recovery if the
jury found that the defendant had constructed catch basins and the
concrete pipe and had collected large quantities of water and discharged
the water upon plaintiff's property-thereby increasing the volume and
rate of flow of such surface water from what it was prior to construction.
'The court determined that the instruction erroneously stated the law in
that there was no consideration given to the legality of the defendant's
activities in developing its property, nor to the fact that the water was
deposited in its natural drainway, nor was there any reference to the
natural capacity of that drainway. Thereafter the court made it clear
that these were factors to be considered. There was no reference to
Belveal v. H.B.C. Development Co.,2 97 but many of the other recent cases
were cited, and the following general rule governing this particular
situation was laid down:
a landowner in the reasonable use and development of
his land may drain it by building thereon sewers, gutters and

297. Ibid.
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such other artificial water channels for the purpose of carrying
off the surface waters into a 'natural surface-water channel'
located on his property without liability to the owner of neighboring land, even though such method of ridding his property of
surface water accelerates and increases the flow thereof, provided that he acts without negligence, and provided further that
he does not exceed the -natural capacity of the drainway to the
298
damage of neighboring property.
In the mind of the court this rule was but a specific application of
the general statement found in many Missouri cases that the common
enemy doctrine must be exercised within reasonable limits. 299 In most of
the cases wherein this general statement is found the acts of the upper
owner have been found to be unreasonable, and only in three cases have
his acts been found reasonable. In all three of these, merely the volume
and rate of flow through a pre-existing ditch were increased. The
supreme court has also said that the rule against collecting and discharging surface water in a body only prohibited the unnecessary collection and discharge (presumably unnecessary would be unreasonable),30°
yet the word unnecessary as used to qualify that rule in a jury instruc30 2
tion was disapproved by both the Kansas City3 0' and Springfield
courts. The very use of the word "reasonable" in the rule stated above
indicates that our courts are no longer willing to apply any rule of surface
water just because it is a rule. In this area of collecting and discharging
there can be no question but that the courts are leaning more and more
to the Reasonable Use Rule without coming right out and calling it by
name.
I. Terracing for Water Management
The terrace system as a means of water management is ideally suited
for the topography of Missouri land. A drive through the rolling farmlands in about any area of the state will allow one to observe the extensive use being made of terrace systems and contour farming. A terrace
system is a means of soil conservation through carefully planned altera-

298. 316 S.W.2d at 625-26.
299. Clark v. City of Springfield, 241 S.W.2d 100 (Spr. Ct. App. 1951). Accord,
Anderson v. City of Jefferson, 262 S.W.2d 169 (K.C. Ct. App. 1953).
300. Keener v. Sharp, 341 Mo. 1192, 1195, 111 S.W.2d 118, 120 (1937).
301. Belveal v. H.B.C. Development Co., 279 S.W.2d 545, 553 (K.C. Ct. App. 1955).
302. Blackburn v. Gaydou, 241 Mo. App. 917, 245 S.W.2d 161 (Spr. Ct. App. 1951).
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tions in the natural layof the land to reduce erosion.30 3 Since any system
of terracing must necessarily interfere with the natural flow of surface
water, it seenis unusual that no cases dealing directly with terracing
have reached the appellate courts.:"" This absence of litigation may
result in part from good neighborliness, and in part from the careful
planning which usually precedes any terrace system. Also once a plan
of terraces has been executed and expenditures made with the adjoining
landowner's consent, the doctrine of estoppel may prevent any dispute
as to the rights involved. Notwithstanding this complete lack of authority
it may be possible to predict the outcome of any litigation arising from
terracing. There is no reason to believe that the courts will apply any
different principles to terracing than to any other similar surface water
problems. If this is true, then we need only apply the law as found in
the cases of the previous sections. There are three basic questions which
arise in connection with a terrace system: first, to what extent must the
surface water from the upper land be accepted into the system; second,
what are the restrictions upon altering the natural flow of the water
,as it- runs ou.t of the- system. onta the. land. below; and-th id, what are
the restrictions upon discharging the water out of the systen. onto. lands
which had not previously received it.
While the terrace system is designed primarily to carry off safely
the rainwater which falls on the terraced area, it is obvious that in many
instances the system will be burdened with the surface water which
flows into it from the land above. The question is presented: does this
water from the higher fields have to be accepted into the system or can
a landowner build an embankment around his farm and keep it out
altogether? As we have seen, the common enemy rule as applied in
Missouri allows great freedom in blocking out surface water at the
property line.303 Some states have held that under that rule a lower
landowner can not obstruct the flow of surface water through a welldefined ravine or gully, but in this state there would seem to be no
restriction upon obstructing drainage through any type of natural
depression were it not for a statutory enactment. It has been held that a

303. See Clark & Wooley, Terracing for Erosion Control, U. oF Mo. Ac. ExT. STA.
BULL. No. 507 (July 1947).
304. Many cases have come to the courts arising out of land drainage and
reclamation and other means of improvement, but none has been directly concerned
with the terrace system of soil conservation.
305. See pt. IV, § G, supra.
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statute almost identical with section 244.010, Missouri Revised Statutes
(1949) " 06 granted a "substantive right" to continued drainage to an
upper landowner where this drainage is through a natural depression
with well-defined banks which leads to a watercourse. With this interpretation the present statute would seem to prevent the obstruction of
anything like a gully or ravine if it leads into a natural stream. Beyond
this, the cases seem to allow complete freedom to block out surface water
at the property line even if it means ponding it back on the upper land.
Assume however that the entire volume of water from above is
accepted. In order to keep the drains and diversion terraces free of
sediment and to prevent silting over the terrace outlets, it is often desirable to build silting basins to intercept the water coming into the system
from above. If the silting basin dam is constructed near the upper property line it may cause the impounded water to back up over the higher
ground. Normally this would be for only a short time, and if the high
ground were in pasture probably no harm would result. However, inundation for only a short time may prove harmful to growing crops.
Under the holding in Farrarv. Shuss "07 it would be wrongful to back
the impounded water across the property line and over the upper land.
It would be no defense that the upper owner could avoid the injury with
30 8
small expense by cutting a drain through his own land.
Assuming that the water is now in the terrace system, either by
rainfall or by drainage from the higher land, in what manner can the
natural flow onto the lower lands be altered in discharging the water
out of the system. There can be no doubt but that the terrace system is
a means of artificially collecting surface water, and the appropriate rules
of collection and discharge, previously discussed, 30 9 would control the
methods of discharge. Since collecting the water and controlling its flow
is the very purpose of the system, the rule of "incidental collection"
would not apply.3 10 The terrace channels and berms in the system are
so constructed that the terrace carries the water slowly around the
natural slope of the field. This prevents scouring out the terrace channel
and carrying away the silt. Usually the terrace will empty the water

306. See pt. IV, § E, supra, for a discussion of the statute.
307. 221 Mo. App. 472, 282 S.W. 512 (K.C. Ct. App. 1926).
308. Kiger v. Sanko, 1 S.W.2d 21S (K.C. Ct. App. 1927).
309. See pt. IV, § H, supra.
310. Grant v. St. Louis, I. Mt. & So. Ry., 149 Mo. App. 306, 130 S.W. 80 (Spr. Ct.
App. 1910).
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into a "terrace outlet," which is a sodded area running down the edge
or center of the field to the lower elevation.
It is recommended that in planning any terrace system, if possible,
the surface water carried in the system should be carried to the same
point where the same acreage of water originally left the farm, and it
should enter the lower land in much the same manner as it did before
the system was installed. Certainly if this is done there can be no
liability for interfering with the natural flow. Unfortunately, there are
things to be considered in setting up the terrace system which may
make it necessary to alter the natural flow to some extent.31 1 This alteration may result in discharging the same quantity of water in a new place
or different manner, or a larger quantity in the same place and same
manner. It is always desirable to construct the terrace outlets in such a
way that the water will flow from the upper land in a diffused condition
across the greatest possible area. If before the terrace system was installed, the water ran to the lower land in this diffused manner, then it
would not be permissible to collect this same amount of water into a
body and discharge it in a concentrated stream. All of the cases would
prohibit this. On the other hand it may be that before the system was
irstallecF the water-r.m -from the upper- farm to the lower land in a
defined natural depression or ditch. As before-stated, then certainly the
same volume of water could be discharged from the system into that
ditch without liability. It seems to go without saying, however, that
the same volume, or even less, cannot be discharged in a single stream
at a different single place on that landowner, and certainly not on land
which had never before been burdened with the water.
The next question presents the problem which most often occurs.
Is it permissible to increase the volume or quantity of water flowing onto
the lower land if this increased volume enters at the same place and in
the same manner? The answer to all situations is not clearly found in the
cases. The increase may be in the amount of water which flows onto
the lower land over a wide area and in a diffused manner, or the amount
which flows through a ditch in a defined channel. Also the increase in
volume may result merely from a change in conditions existing in the

311. For example, other than the legality of the system, there are the consideratfons of convenient access to and from the farm in its management, and of course the
economy in setting up the system.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol24/iss3/1

34

SURFACE
WATER
MISSOURI
Snodgrass
and Davis: Snodgrass:
Law ofINSurface
Water in Missouri

1959]

terraced area, or it may result from draining a larger area into the
particular outlet in question.
Consider first the situation where the water enters the lower land
in a diffused state and the only effect of the terrace system is to increase
the quantity. The basic rule in Missouri restricting the upper landowner's
rights to alter the natural flow does not prohibit merely increasing the
volume; there must be some collection by artificial means, and the water
so collected must be cast in a concentrated stream onto the lower lands.
As before stated, the terrace system is an intentional method of collecting
the surface water and therefore not merely incidental. This would distinguish the situation from that in Casanover v. Villanova31 2 where the
increase in volume of water which flowed onto the plaintiffs' lots was the
incidental result of stripping the defendant's land in preparation for a
city subdivision. There was.no liability in that case. Not withstanding
the intentional collection of the water by the terrace system there could
seem to be no liability unless it is discharged upon the lower land in
such a manner as to fall within the ambit of the terms "in a body" or
"concentrated stream." This would seem unlikely if the water enters
the lower land over a wide area the same as it did originally. In this
regard the holding in Polich v. Hermann3 13 should be considered. From
that case it could be argued that once surface water is collected by artificial means, and the volume increased, then any manner of discharge
will be "in a body." It is submitted that this is not true in fact, as many
well planned terrace systems illustrate, and therefore should not be a
legal argument. There would appear to be no liability where only the
volume of water flowing onto the lower land in a broad sheet is increased.
The attitude of the courts toward the whole problem of increased
volume may be revealed in three recent cases already mentioned where
the amount of water flowing onto the lower land in a well-defined channel was merely increased. In both Young v. Moore " 14 and White v.
Wabash R.R. 31 5 surface water had been collected and discharged into
pre-existing ditches with a resultant increase in the volume flowing
through those outlets. In each instance there was no liability for this
action. The decision in the White case could probably be based entirely

312.
313.
314.
315.

209
219
241
240

S.W.2d 556 (St L. Ct. App. 1948).
S.W.2d 849 (St. L. Ct App. 1949).
Mo. App. 436, 236 S.W.2d 740 (Spr. Ct. App. 1951).
Mo. App. 344, 207 S.W.2d 505 (K.C. Ct. App. 1947).
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upon a pertinent statute, 16 but the court also talked of non-statutory
rights. In the Young case the Springfield Court of Appeals expressly
stated that the defendlant had not gone beyond his rights under the
common enemy rule. The court in that case held that there would be
no liability for the damage caused by the increased volume as the defendant had acted "prudently and reasonably."
Thus, while the opinion in Polich v. Hermann may indicate that the
discharge of water out of the terrace system is always in a "concentrated"
stream, for purposes of legal treatment; nevertheless, the holding in
Young v. Moore would seem to sanction any increase in volume which
is reasonable even if the concentrated stream is a fact. And, if the test
is one of reasonableness, then any increase resulting from the mere installation of the terrace system would in most instances be permissible;
an increase in volume resulting from increased acreage would be more
questionable. In the latest case handed down from the supreme court,
Haferkamp v. City of Rock Hill, it was held that an instruction was
erroneous which predicated liability upon merely increasing the volume
and rate of flow of surface water through a pre-existing ditch which
started on defendant's land and ran onto the plaintiff's. The court
stated that consideration should have been given to the natural capacity
of the ditch and to the reasonableness and legality of the defendant's
operations. The defendant was opening up a subdivision on his urban
land, and the increased volume and accelerated flow complained of in
that case were caused by the construction of streets and houses which
would seem to be no more "reasonable" than farm terracing. It is
doubtful if the courts would ever find it reasonable to cause a volume
increase by "pulling in" water from another watershed, although practically speaking such action may seem very reasonable in the terrace
development.
The discussion of the previous situations reveals the answer to the
third question arising from the terrace system. What are the restrictions
upon discharging the water from the system, either in a concentrated
stream or in a diffused condition upon lands which were never burdened
with such water previous to the system's installation All of the cases
would condemn discharging the water onto such land in a concentrated
stream. If the water is discharged out of the system across a wide area

316. See pt. IV, § C, supra,for a discussion of the statute and railroads in general.
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in a diffused manner, it would be possible to argue that there had been
no discharge "in a body," which may well be the fact; but to the knowledge of this author there has never been an instance in which the water
was artificially collected that it was not held to have been discharged
"in a body." Conceivably any discharge of water in any manner onto
the land of a third party would be condemned.
In conclusion it should be mentioned that considering the many
unanswered questions pertaining to terracing, extra precautions should
be taken to insure against liability before the terrace system is installed.
As before indicated, the best method of avoiding dispute and litigation
is to accept the surface water from above into the terracing system and
discharge it from the system in the same manner as it originally left the
farm. To assert a legal right may cause immeasurable ill feeling, and
social harmony is many times all important in the farming neighborhood.
Should there be any doubt as to the legal right to back up or discharge
surface water across a neighbor's land, it may be advisable to bargain
for an express easement from the affected landowner. In most instances
the consideration, if any, would be slight, and the existance of the easement could not only prevent litigation and liability, but could also avoid
any breach in community relations.
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